The emphasis in the literature on the substitution of nonmarket activities for market work during years when the pension constraints are binding overlooks full life-cycle adjustments to such constraints. Exceptions to this are Lewis (1957) and more recently Smith (1975) , who suggest that programs like social security, which place earnings tests on wages during one period of life, change a worker's lifetime relative-wage pattern, inducing substitution of market work from the constrained to the unconstrained years of life. Induced intertemporal substitution of time raises hours of work of prime-age males, but social security may also have a wealth effect that reduces labor supply. Feldstein (1974) argues that social security intergenerational transfers are not entirely offset by private intergenerational transfers. If this is the case, increases in the wealth of recipients reduces their labor supply during all ages of life. However, if there is no net change in total transfers, as Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1977 argues, then no wealth-induced labor-supply changes occur.
We test the empirical importance of the intertemporal effects of social security on the market-work behavior of prime-age males. In doing so we suggest an explanation for the changes in the labor supply of males in this age group over the past 4 decades. The test of the intertemporal effects of social security provides evidence for the life-cycle labor-supply hypothesis that wages in one period affect labor supply in other periods. The effect of social security on savings is a related and controversial topic. Feldstein (1974) finds a large negative effect of social security on private savings, whereas Barro (1977) finds no effect. Since savings and labor-supply decisions are interrelated, this paper provides some evidence on the effect of social security on savings.
The paper is organized in three sections. Section I reviews time-series changes in the labor-force participation of men. Section II presents a theoretical analysis of the effect of social security on labor supply of men during their younger unconstrained years. An empirical analysis is presented in Section III.
I. Time-Series Work Pattern of Males
There have been two major changes in the pattern of male labor-force participation since World War II. First, in sharp contrast to the secular decline in the work week preceding World War II, hours of work for primeage males in the United States have remained relatively constant over the last 35 years. Second, unlike the fall in market work during the depressed economic conditions of the 1930s, the decrease in labor-force activity of older men since 1947 has continued through both slack and tight periods of general demand.
Column 1 of The presence of both an earnings test and an actuarial penalty for postponing acceptance of benefits is needed in order for a distortion in labor-market activities to occur, as is shown in the modified one-period graph of figure 1. A worker aged 65 who chooses to take social security is normally seen as facing the budget constraint line abcd. Over line segment ab, the wages are below the limit taxed by the earnings test. Over line segment bc, the earnings test is in effect, and for each dollar of wages earned, $0.50 in benefits are lost. Over line segment cd, benefits are completely exhausted, and the earnings test ends. Line segment cd is also part of line ecd, which is the budget constraint of the worker who chooses not to take social security benefits in this period. As shown, ecd assumes that benefits from social security are completely lost if postponed over the period. If future benefits are increased due to postponing acceptance in this period, which has been the case since 1972, part of the loss is made up, and ecd underestimates the budget possibility set for this worker. Line e'c'd' reflects the increase in the present value of future benefits caused by postponing acceptance of benefits in this period.4 As can be seen from the figure, the greater the actuarial increase in benefits in future periods, the higher e'c'd' rises, and the more likely a worker is to postpone benefits. The case where the increase in future benefits is actuarially fair is rep-2 Even with an earnings-test constraint, hours worked by older men would be no more affected by social security benefits than by any other type of asset, if the flow of social security benefits could be delayed with no net loss in their asset value. In this case, no asset wealth is lost by delay, and since the constraint is binding only when benefits are accepted, benefits would merely be delayed until the point the constraint was no longer binding on market work. 3 The earnings test is currently applicable between the ages of 62 and 71. During this age period, the test will reduce the net wages of most workers, since above a minimum level social security benefit reductions of $0.50 occur for each additional $1.00 of workrelated income received. During the years prior to 1972, the marginal tax was 100 percent over some earnings ranges. 4 In such a case, the value ee' is equal to the expected present value of all additional benefits gained through delayed acceptance in the initial period. For a man aged 65 who delayed accepting benefits until the age of 66, it would be ee' = ,n , PiB65*d/(l + r)', where ee' = present discounted value; Pi = probability of living through period (i); B65 = benefit at age 65 (in the case of fig. 1 resented by line abk. In such a case no worker will ever choose to be on line segment bc, and the earnings test is irrelevant. But the greater the value of net social security benefits lost when their acceptance is postponed, the greater the range of line segment bc, and the more likely a worker is to accept the work constraint and take social security benefits. Burkhauser (1978) has shown that the difference in the asset value of private-pension benefits based on a worker's age at acceptance is an important factor both in the timing of private-pension acceptance and in the market-work decisions of older men.
The point of departure for this paper is that social security also affects work during the unconstrained periods of the life cycle. Since wages are subject to the earnings test only during the constrained period, the relative value of time is changed across a worker's lifetime. This implicit tax on wages during one period of life induces a worker to substitute time in the market at younger ages for time during the constrained period. The net loss in the asset value of social security directly affects the decision to accept social security benefits and its accompanying earnings test. It is this difference in asset value of social security, which is positively related to total social security wealth, that causes a positive substitution effect on the labor supply of prime-age males. 5 
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The intertemporal substitution effect of social security is distinct from the wealth effect of social security discussed by Feldstein (1974) and Barro (1974) . If there is a positive wealth effect associated with social security, as Feldstein argues (i.e., if social security transfers result in a net increase in the wealth of a generation), then this effect of social security will offset to some extent the positive effect of the induced substitution of market working time toward the unconstrained periods. The sign and magnitude of the social security wealth coefficients in the estimated regressions in the next section provide evidence relating to the relative magnitude of the two effects.6
There is a functional relationship between changes in savings and market work consistent with changes in net wealth due to social security transfers. Writing the income-consumption identity Y = C+ S
in logarithmic differential form gives
where E is the operator d In, Y is personal disposable income, C is consumption, and S is savings. Assuming that the relative price of time (wage) and goods is unchanged by social security transfers in the unconstrained years, the proportion of time and goods in household production will be unchanged.7 Since no relative prices have changed in this period, the change security system, it is also a function of changes in the interest rate, expected probability of life of recipients, and the way the system adjusts benefits if delayed. With no loss in asset value if postponed, the earnings test is irrelevant, and no substitution occurs across periods. With benefits tied directly to wages in an actuarially fair manner, social security is a totally neutral system with respect to all labor/leisure decisions. 6 In addition to the substitution effect caused by the constraints on market earnings at older ages, another effect may be important. Since transfers are to some degree related to earnings, this affects the relative wage of workers at younger ages. Workers whose marginal wages are affected by social security "tax" paid on earnings have an additional substitution effect. For the generations of workers in this sample in which the net wealth effect of social security is positive, rather than a "tax" on wages at younger ages, contributions into the system yield a wage "benefit." To the degree that this is a factor, it would increase the relative wage at younger ages and increase work during this period. Its empirical importance in changing the relative wage may be small, since workers earning above the maximum tax ceiling have a zero marginal tax. For those below the taxable maximum, the marginal tax was only 2 percent from 1937 to 1950 and by 1971 was 8.1 percent. This compares with a marginal tax of 100 percent on earnings from 1937 to 1971 for those accepting social security benefits. Estimations of the relationship between marginal earnings and social security benefits are further clouded since benefits are a function of marital status, age, and life expectancy as well as earnings. In addition, the benefits are tilted in favor of workers with low yearly wages and fewer years of lifetime work (above some minimum).
7 In addition to assuming that benefits are not directly related to wages, it assumes a homothetic production function, within a single-commodity-consumption model. When the single-commodity assumption is relaxed, one must assume each commodity's wealth elasticity is unity and that substitution of commodities across periods due to relative wage changes occurs at the same rate. in consumption expenditures due to the wealth effect will equal the percentage change in nonmarket time H:
Writing the allocation of time identity 
where L is labor-market time and T is total time per period, in logarithmic differential form and substituting into (2) yields EY = -(LC/YH)EL + (S/Y)ES.

EL = (Y/L)[H/(H + C)](S/Y)ES. (7)
With an estimate of the wealth effect of social security on savings, knowledge about the earned share of income (L/Y), the average propensity to save (S/Y), and the share of nonmarket time in household production [H/(H + C)], the implied labor-supply effect for prime-age males is determined. Table 2 The values for Ew are based on implicit earnings test taxes of 50 and 100 percent, the two tax rates used by social security during the history of the program. As can be seen from table 3, substitution effects are predicted to increase hours worked per week by 1.5-9.0 percent, or 0.6-3.8 hours. It is important to note that Smith's equation is relevant because an adjustment to the earnings test is necessary. If the asset value of social security were independent of age at acceptance, the earnings test would be irrelevant and cause no substitution in life-cycle labor supply.
III. Empirical Analysis
Owen ( 
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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY due to social security transfers are not entirely transferred back to the next generation. He contends that this leads to decreases in savings and, as we have shown, decreases in hours worked in the labor market. But the increase in the value of the net difference in social security benefits induces a substitution effect through the earnings test, which increases hours worked in the unconstrained years of a worker's life. The fact that the coefficient for social security wealth is consistently positive suggests that the substitution effect dominates the wealth effect in our regression equations.
The interaction of a time trend with social security was entered to capture the change in Q, the average noncovered work period of men. The interaction is significantly negative. This is consistent with the expected effect of an increase in the average noncovered work period over time as younger workers replace older workers who have spent only part of their work life under the social security system. For the period 1929-61, the interaction is not significant. When the net effect of these two variables is measured, the increase in hours worked due to social security varies from about 2 to 3 hours per week. " This result is within the range predicted using the Smith ( 
IV. Conclusion
Evidence has been presented suggesting that social security has raised the work week over 2 hours above what it otherwise would be for prime-age males. Some would argue that this effect of social security is desirable, since it offsets the reduction in the labor supply at older ages when the earnings test is in operation. In fact, in addition to causing a misallocation of resources due to exit from the market during the age that the constraint is in effect, it also causes higher than optimal labor supply during noncovered periods.
The link between the increased coverage and benefits of social security and the rapid decline in the labor-force participation rates of older men is well known. Our results, despite their weakness in the postwar period, show that social security also affects the market work of younger men. It is SOCIAL SECURITY AND ITS EFFECT 7I3 likely that the fall in hours worked per week experienced in the first 3 decades of the century would have continued at least to some degree if no earnings test were attached to social security.
The range of estimated changes in hours worked per week due to the wealth and substitution effects in tables 2 and 3 is too large for our findings to rule out a savings effect of the magnitude suggested by Feldstein. It is clear, however, that the net effect of social security is to increase hours worked and that over most of the possible range of values simulated the size of the wealth effect compatible with this change is closer to Barro's findings than to Feldstein's. 
